Towards an Information Theoretic Analysis of Searchable Encryption (Extended Version) by Sedghi, S. et al.
Towards an Information Theoretic Analysis of
Searchable Encryption (Extended Version)
Saeed Sedghi, Jeroen Doumen, Pieter Hartel, Willem Jonker
University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
Abstract. Searchable encryption is a technique that allows a client to
store data in encrypted form on a curious server, such that data can be
retrieved while leaking a minimal amount of information to the server.
Many searchable encryption schemes have been proposed and proved
secure in their own computational model. In this paper we propose a
generic model for the analysis of searchable encryptions. We then iden-
tify the security parameters of searchable encryption schemes and prove
information theoretical bounds on the security of the parameters. We
argue that perfectly secure searchable encryption schemes cannot be ef-
ficient. We classify the seminal schemes in two categories: the schemes
that leak information upfront during the storage phase, and schemes that
leak some information at every search. This helps designers to choose the
right scheme for an application.
1 Introduction
Storage outsourcing is a popular approach towards reducing the total cost of
ownership of enterprise data storage. Current solutions either store data in plain,
such that the confidentiality of the data is easily compromised, or the data is
stored encrypted, which severely limits the kind of service that can be provided.
In particular, the ability to search encrypted data is much needed but difficult to
provide. Searchable encryption has many applications, particularly where client
privacy is a main concern such as in E-mail servers [3], keeping medical informa-
tion of a client [16], storing private videos and photos, and backup applications
[15].
There are two trivial, extreme approaches towards searching in encrypted
data. The first trivial approach is for the server to send the client the entire en-
crypted data base, such that the client may decrypt, then query. Although this
solution has a high security, the communication overhead between the server and
the client is prohibitively high. The second trivial approach is for the server to
decrypt the entire data base, then to execute the query. Although this solution is
efficient, letting the server decrypt the data base offers poor security. The prob-
lem is thus to find a good compromise between query and data communication
efficiency on the one hand, and security on the other hand.
Efficiency means that the query performance should not be influenced nega-
tively by encryption, and that data communication to and from the server should
be appropriate. Security means that the stored data, the query that the client
sends to the server to retrieve the data selectively, and executing the query on
the stored data should not reveal any information to the server about the data
except the data items matched with the query.
Three seminal searchable encryption schemes have been proposed [15, 3, 9],
each with specific advantages and disadvantages. A good overview is provided in
the PhD thesis of Brinkman [4]. The main problem with each of these propos-
als is that they assume different limitations: in each case the security analysis
assumes a specific model consisting of an adversary with specific limitations.
Therefore, the security analysis in each case does not show exactly which pa-
rameters reveal information to the server, in a manner that allows us to compare
the leakage of schemes.
Contribution We propose a model for searchable encryption that facilitates
an information theoretic security analysis against an adversary with unlimited
power. Since an information theoretic analysis implies no restriction on the com-
putational model of the adversary, information leakage from the parameters is
computable in this model. We stress that an information theoretic approach
requires idealized encryption and hash functions, and as such this work is an ex-
ploration into the theoretical properties of searchable encryption. We apply our
model and analysis method to the three seminal approaches towards searchable
encryption to show that the model and the analysis method are both general
and powerful. The scope of our analysis and results in this paper is limited to a
single client using a single server to store a single data item. There can be any
number of keywords associated with the data item, and the client may perform
any number of keyword searches. The extension to multiple data items, multiple
clients and multiple servers is future work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the problem. Section 3
presents our approach towards analyzing the security of searchable encryption
schemes. Section 4 analyzes the security of the three seminal searchable encryp-
tion schemes. A summary of the related work is described in Sect. 5. We present
some concrete examples of our analysis in Sect. 6. The last section concludes
and suggests future work.
2 Statement of the Problem
Notation. We use the following notation, which is borrowed from Moulin et
al [11]. Random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X) and their
individual values by lower case letters (e.g. x). The domain over which a random
variable is defined is denoted by a script letter (e.g. X ) and the number of
elements in the range of X is denoted by |X |. The probability mass function
(pmf) of a random variable X ∈ X is denoted by PX(x). When no confusion
is possible, we drop the subscript to simplify the notation. We write X ∼ PX
to indicate that a random variable X is distributed according to PX . Given
random variables X and Y , we denote the entropy of X by H(X), the entropy
of X conditioned on Y by H(X|Y ) and the mutual information between X and
Y by I(X;Y ).
2.1 Description of the Problem
There are various formulations of the searchable encryption problem. We propose
the following generic formulation in this paper. Without loss of generality we
assume that the client splits his data into a non-searchable part d and a set of
searchable keywords m. Referring to Fig. 1, let us assume that a client is about
to store a tuple u =< d,m > consisting of a single data item d and an associated
metadata item m on a server. The metadata m is actually a set of l keywords
m = {w1, ..., wl} where each keyword is taken from a finite setW. The objectives
of the client are:
1. The confidentiality of d and m is preserved.
2. d is retrieved in the case m contains a queried keyword.
All solutions to the searchable encryption problem proceed in four phases:
Setup: The client and the server may need to share some data and functions
and each may need to prepare some private data.
Storage: The data and the metadata items are transformed to an appropri-
ate format for storage on the server by the steps below:
-
-u =< d,m >
d
m = {w1, ..., wl}
Data function s -
s(d, k)
- c = f(m)Metadata function f -
-
Server
Verification
t =
< s(d, k), c >
function v
Client
-w -q = g(w)Query function g
ff t =< s(d, k), c > is sent back if v(q, c) = 1
Fig. 1. Formulation of the searchable encryption problem. Here, d is a data item, and
m = {w1, ..., wl} is the associated metadata.
– The client transforms m to a searchable representation c = f(m), where f(.)
is a metadata function.
– The client transforms d to an appropriate encrypted form for storage on the
server s(d, k), where s(., .) is a data function and k ∈ K is a secret key.
– The client sends the tuple t =< s(d, k), c > to the server for storage.
Query: To query the server if a keyword w ∈ W occurs in m, the client sends
the query q = g(w) to the server, where g(.) is a query function.
Search: Given q and c, using a verification function v(., .) the server checks
if v(q, c) = 1, t =< s(d, k), c > is sent back to the client in case of a match.
2.2 Problem Instances
The data d, the metadata m and the functions s(., .), f(.), g(.) and v(., .) are the
parameters of our proposed searchable encryption formulation. To show that this
is a realistic formulation we will instantiate these parameters in such a way that
the formulation specializes to the three seminal searchable encryption schemes.
These are: Song, Wagner, and Perrig (SWP) [15], Public key encryption with
keyword search (PEKS) [3], and Secure indexes (SI) [9]. Below a description of
the listed schemes is presented.
The SWP scheme. The first practical approach to the problem of searchable
encryption has been proposed by Song, Wagner and Perrig [15]. This scheme does
not search for keywords in the metadata; instead searching approaches the data
directly. The SWP scheme requires the client to split the data item d into fixed
size blocks d = (b1, ..., bl) and calculates a searchable representation for each
block bi. However, to apply our formulation to the SWP scheme we consider
each block to be a keyword, i.e. wi = bi.
Setup: The client and the server agree to use a hash function h1 : {0, 1}v ×
{0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n−v, where n is the number of bits in each keyword and
1 ≤ v < n. The client also uses a hash function h2 :W −→ {0, 1}n.
Storage f(m): To generate a searchable representation c = f(m), the client:
1. Generates a sequence of random values ri ∈ {0, 1}v, 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
2. Generates a sequence of trapdoors xi = ri||h1(ri, h2(wi)), 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
3. Produces e(wi, k) using a symmetric key encryption function e(., .), and
a secret key k ∈ K, for each keyword wi ∈ m.
4. Generates ci = xi ⊕ e(wi, k), for each keyword wi ∈ m.
5. Gathers the sequence c = (c1, ..., cl) since the data item is actually a
sequence of keywords d = (w1, ..., wl).
The client sends the tuple t =< s(d, k), c > to the server for storage, where
s(d, k) = 0.
Query g(w): To search for a keyword w ∈ W, the client sends the query q =<
e(w, k), h2(w) > to the server.
Search v(q, c): After receiving q, the server calculates the trapdoor y′i||y′′i =
ci ⊕ e(w, k) for each element ci of c and checks if y′′i = h1(y′i, h2(w)); the
server sends back t =< s(d, k), c > to the client in case of a match.
The PEKS scheme. The main disadvantage of the SWP scheme is that the
encrypted keyword(s) must be sent to the server for the verification function.
Boneh et al [3] propose the idea of a public key searchable encryption based
on the Diffie-Hellman problem. In contrast with the SWP scheme, searching is
performed on a set of keywords m = {w1, ..., wl} associated with the data d.
Setup The client chooses two groups of prime order p, G1 and G2, using group
generators g1 and g2 respectively and a non-degenerate bilinear function
b : G1×G1 −→ G2. The server and the client agree to use two hash functions
h1 : {0, 1}∗ −→ G1 and h2 : G2 −→ {0, 1}[log(p)]. The client picks a random
numbers α ∈ Zp such that gα1 ∈ G1.
Storage f(m): To generate a searchable representation c = f(m), the client:
1. Generates a random value ri ∈ Zp for each keyword wi ∈ m.
2. Generates a searchable representation ci =< gri1 , h2(b(h1(wi), g
(riα)
1 )) >
for each wi ∈ m.
3. Gathers a set c = {c1, ..., cl}, since the metadata is a set of keywords.
The client sends the tuple t =< s(d, k), c > to the server for storage, where
s(d, k) is any appropriate encryption of d.
Query g(w): To query for a keyword w ∈ W, the client sends q = h1(w)α to
the server.
Search v(q, c): The server checks for each element ci of c, if h2(b(q, gri)) =
h2(b(h1(wi), g(riα))); t =< s(d, k), c > is sent back to the client in case of a
match.
The SI scheme. Both the SWP and the PEKS schemes have the disadvantage
that a search takes time linear in the number of keywords. To obtain a secure,
efficient and practical method, Goh [9] proposes an approach to map each
keyword to a hash value. The client has a data item d and an associated set of
keywords m = {w1, ..., wl} to store on the server.
Setup The client chooses z ≥ 1 independent hash functions h1, ..., hz, where
each hi :W −→ {0, 1}j , j ∈ N.
Storage f(m): To generate a searchable representation c = f(m), the client:
1. Calculates a trapdoor xi = {h1(wi), ..., hz(wi)} for each keyword wi ∈ m.
2. Represents c by an array of 2j bits, where each element cn, 1 ≤ n ≤ 2j ,
takes the value 0 or 1 as follows:
cn =
{
1 if there is at least one hs(wi) = n, i = 1, ..., l, s = 1, .., z
0 Otherwise (1)
The client sends the tuple t =< s(d, k), c > to the server, where s(d, k) is
any appropriate encryption of d.
Query g(w): To query for a keyword w ∈ W the client sends q = {q1, ..., qz},
where qs = hs(w), s = 1, ..., z, to the server.
Search v(q, c): The server checks for all 1 ≤ s ≤ z if cqs = 1; s(d, k) is sent back
to the client in case of a match.
Table 1 summarizes the functions to be used for f(.), g(.) and v(., .) by each
of the cited methods.
Parameters of the formulation
Scheme t =< d,m > c = f(m) q = g(w) v(q, c)
m = {w1, ..., wl}
ci = e(wi, k)⊕ xi, x′i||x′′i = ci ⊕ e(w, k)
SWP [15] d = (b1, .., bl) where q = e(w, k) Check if
wi = bi xi = ri||h(ri) x′′i = h(x′i)
d c = {hj(wi)} for q = {hj(w)} Check if
SI [9] m j = 1, ..., z and for j = 1, ..., z q ⊂ c
i = 1, .., l
d ci =< xi, yi > Check if
PEKS [3] m where xi = g
ri and q = (h1(w))
α h2(b(q, xi)) = yi
yi = h2(b(h1(wi), g
riα))
Table 1. Summary of the employed functions in searchable encryption approaches.
In this table r is a random number, h(.) is a hash function, e(., .) is an encryption
function, g(.) is a group generator, and b(., .) is a bilinear map.
3 Security Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the security of searchable encryption schemes. SWP [15]
informally divide the security evaluation of searchable encryption schemes into
the following properties:
– Provable security: A searchable encryption scheme is provably secure if the
confidentiality of the data and the metadata is preserved before performing
any search.
– Hidden query: A searchable encryption scheme is hidden query if a received
query does not leak any information on the queried keyword.
– Query isolation: A searchable encryption scheme supports query isolation if
the server learns nothing about the metadata after a search is performed.
There are two approaches for evaluating the security of cryptographic schemes:
the information theoretic approach and the computational complexity approach.
While the information theoretic approach evaluates the security of cryptographic
schemes against an adversary with unlimited computational power, the compu-
tational complexity approach decides whether it is feasible for an adversary with
reasonably limited computational power to extract information about the plain-
text of a ciphertext.
All the previously proposed searchable encryption schemes are proved se-
cure in the computational complexity setting. However, we are interested in the
theoretical bounds on the security of searchable encryption schemes in general,
and the seminal schemes mentioned earlier in particular. Therefore, we use an
information theoretic approach to analyze the security of idealized searchable
encryption schemes.
In Section 3 we present and motivate four assumptions that formalize the
difference between the seminal schemes as published and their idealized inter-
pretations analyzed here.
We now formalize the security evaluation of searchable encryption schemes
using the tools of information theory as follows:
– Provable security: We formalize the provable security of d as I(D; s(D,K), f(M))
(i.e. the information that the stored tuple < f(M),s(D,K) > leaks on D)
and the provable security of m as I(M ; s(D,K), f(M)) (i.e. the information
that the stored tuple < f(M),s(D,K) > leaks on M).
– Hidden query: We formalize hidden query as I(W ; g(W )) (i.e. the infor-
mation that a query leaks on the queried keyword).
– Query isolation: We formalize query isolation as: I(M ; v(f(M), g(W )))
(i.e. the information that a search result leaks on the metadata).
3.1 Security Parameters of the Formulation
In this section we introduce a convenient notation for the information leakage
from each searchable encryption parameter. In our formulation we have four
different functions that can leak information:
– The stored data s(d, k) leaks on d: εs = I(D; s(D,K)).
– The searchable representation f(m) leaks on m: εf = I(M ; f(M)).
– The query g(w) leaks on w: εg = I(W ; g(W )).
– The search result v(f(m), g(w)) leaks on m: εv = I(M ; v(g(W ), f(M))).
Here, εg and εv correspond to hidden query and query isolation respectively.
An idealized searchable encryption scheme has perfect security if:
εs = εf = εg = εv = 0 (2)
Theorem 1, relates provable security to εs and εf by giving upper bounds on
the uncertainty of the server about the data and the metadata items, under the
condition that the server has access to s(d, k) and f(m).
Theorem 1. The provable security of any searchable encryption scheme admits
the following upper bound:
I(D; s(D,K), f(M)) ≤ εs + εf −H(M |D) +H(M |D, f(M))
I(M ; s(D,K), f(M)) ≤ εf + εs −H(D|M) +H(D|M, s(D,K))
Proof: see the appendix.
The intuition of the first inequality is as follows: εs is the information that the
stored data s(D,K) leaks on D directly, and εf −H(M |D) +H(M |D, f(M)) is
the information that the searchable representation f(M) leaks on D indirectly
via M . A similar intuition applies to the second inequality.
4 Analysis of Known Schemes
The security of searchable encryption schemes is analyzed in related work using
the computational complexity approach. The reason is that the cryptographic
primitives which are used for the data, the metadata, the query and the verifi-
cation function (e.g. block ciphers and hash functions) are not information the-
oretically secure. Here, we are interested in an adversary with unlimited power,
who however cannot look inside the cryptographic primitives. In other words, we
analyze whether searchable encryption schemes leak information to the server
under the assumption that perfectly secure cryptographic primitives are used:
Assumption 1. Any encryption function is a one-time pad encryption since
only the one time pad encryption has been proved to be information theo-
retically secure.
Assumption 2. The client uses a secret table by way of a hash function. In most
cases considered here, the server does not need to know the hash function
h. A secret table works as follows: given y = h(x), and a string y it is
impossible to find the corresponding bit string x, whereas in the case that
h(.) is a hash function, it is hard to find the string x. Therefore, a secret
table is information theoretically secure and I(W ;h(W )) = 0.
We make the following assumptions on the distribution of the keywords in the
metadata:
Assumption 3. The distribution of the total number of keywords in m is L v
PL(l). i.e. clients tend to choose the number of keywords according to a
distribution which depends on the application domain.
Assumption 4. Given the total number of keywords, l, the distribution of
choosing a keyword P (w ∈ M|L = l) is uniform. i.e. the client picks each
keyword from the set W with the same probability. Although this assump-
tion might not be correct for all practical situations, the uniform distribution
of keywords gives the highest security in comparison with the other distri-
butions.
These assumptions are purely theoretical. In particular, we are not suggest-
ing to use a one time pad encryption as in this case outsourcing data to the data
base would not help the client (i.e. the secret key must be as large as the data
itself). The hash table is just as impractical. However, these assumptions allow
us to analyze how close the seminal schemes are to ideal security. In other words,
by these assumptions the client uses the most secure cryptographic primitives
(for the data, metadata, query and verification functions) and keyword distri-
bution, and we explore the theoretical upper bounds on the security of these
schemes. Moreover, our results show how much information the parameters of
the searchable encryption schemes leak to the server.
When it comes to a practical implementation, the leakage of information
from the functions can not be smaller than what is derived here. The reason
is that although the cryptographic primitives are secure against an adversary
with limited power, they are not information theoretically secure. Therefore,
our results show:
1. The minimum leakage of information from the functions of searchable en-
cryption in all situations.
2. Which functions of a searchable encryption scheme leak more information,
and which functions leak less information. This type of analysis is not pos-
sible in computational security settings.
4.1 Idealized SWP
The parameters of the SWP scheme are as follows: the data and the metadata are
the same d = m, there is no stored data on the server s(d, k) = 0, the metadata
is a sequence of keywords m = (w1, ..., wl), for each keyword wi ∈ m a random
value ri is generated. According to assumption 1, the encryption function e(., .)
is a one time-pad encryption. Hence, each keyword wi ∈ m is encrypted using a
unique key ki ∈ {0, 1}n as e(wi, ki).
– The information leakage from s(D,K): Since there is no stored data in
the SWP scheme (s(D,K) = 0),
εs = I(D; s(D,K)) = 0 (3)
– The information leakage from f(M): Let define the function
T (e(m, k)) = e(m, k)⊕ (r1||h(r1), ..., rl||h(rl)) (4)
then f(m) = T (e(m, k)), where k = (k1, ..., kl). Since M −→ e(M,K) −→
T (e(M,K)) forms a Markov chain:
I(M ;T (e(M,K))) ≤ I(M |e(M,K)) (5)
Using one time pad encryption for e(m, k), I(M |e(M,K)) = 0 [14]. Hence,
εf = I(M ; f(M)) = 0 (6)
Therefore, the searchable representation achieves perfect secrecy.
– The information leakage from g(W ): To query for a keyword w the client
sends the query g(w) =< e(w, k), h1(w) > to the server. Hence,
εg = I(W ; e(W,K), h1(W )) (7)
Using standard information theoretic formulas:
εg = I(W ;h1(W )) + I(W ; e(W,K)|h1(W )) (8)
According to assumption 2, I(W ;h(W )) = 0, and according to assumption
1, I(W ; e(W,K)) = 0. Hence, εg = 0. Therefore, a query does not leak any
information about the keyword queried.
– The information leakage from v(f(M), g(W )): The SWP scheme trans-
forms each keyword wi to a unique searchable representation ci, since each
keyword is transformed to a searchable representation by a unique random
value ri. Therefore, if the keywords wi and wj are the same keywords in
the metadata, ci and cj are different. However, if the client sends the query
g(wi) (or g(wj)) to the server, by the search result the server learns that ci
and cj are searchable representations of the same keywords. Therefore, the
uncertainty of the server about ci and cj reduces to the uncertainty about ci
(or cj) alone. The following theorem quantifies the information that a search
leaks on M .
Theorem 2. Let P (M |L) = 1|W|l , E(S) denotes the expected number of
repeated keywords and E(L) denotes the expected number of keywords in M .
Then,
εv = I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) = H(W )(E(S)− 1) (9)
where E(S) ≈ ( 1|W| ).
Proof: see the appendix.
Intuitively, Theorem 2 says that the uncertainty of the repeated keywords
is the reductions in the uncertainty ofM due to the knowledge of a search re-
sult. If each keyword occurs once inM , then E(S) = 1 and I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) =
0, and if all the keywords are the same, then E(S)) = E(L) and I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) =
E(L)− 1.
Summarizing, even using perfectly secure cryptographic primitives for the
SWP scheme, a search reveals some information to the server. However, storing
data does not leak any information.
4.2 Idealized SI
Without loss of generality we assume that the client uses only one hash function
h(.) to map each keyword w to a searchable representation h(w). (i.e. f(m) =
{h(w1), ..., h(wl)}). According to assumption 2, the client uses a secret table by
way of the hash function. We also assume that P (M |L) = 1(|W|l ) , since according
to assumption 4 the distribution of keywords in the metadata is uniform and the
metadata is a set of keywords.
– The information leakage from s(D,K): Since we assume that encryption
is one time-pad encryption (assumption 1), the stored data achieves perfect
secrecy [14]. Hence,
εs = I(D; s(D,K)) = 0 (10)
– The information leakage from f(M): In contrast with the SWP scheme,
the SI scheme admits false positives. A false positive occurs when two or
more different keywords are mapped to the same searchable representation
by h(.). First we evaluate the information leakage in the case without false
positives. We then extend the evaluation in the case of a probability of a
false positive.
- Without false positives:
εf = I(M ; f(M)) = I(M ;h(W1), ..., h(WL)) (11)
Theorem 3 shows the information leakage from f(M) in the case without
false positive.
Theorem 3. The information that the searchable representation leaks on
the metadata is:
εf = I(M ; f(M)) = H(L) (12)
where H(L) is the uncertainty in the number of unique keywords in the
metadata.
Proof: See the appendix.
Intuitively, Theorem 4 says that the uncertainty in the number of unique
keywords contained in the metadata is the reduction in the uncertainty of
the metadata due to the knowledge of the searchable representation.
- A False positive:
In this case the server cannot learn the precise number of unique keywords
since more than one unique keywords could be mapped to the same search-
able representation. The following theorem shows how the probability a false
positive P reduces the information that f(M) leaks on M .
Theorem 4. Let j be the number of bits in the output of the hash values.
Then,
εf = I(M,f(M)) = H(L)− β (13)
Here, β =
∑|W|
i=1
∑i
x=1(P (i)log(
1
(Wi )
) + (2
j)!xi−l
(2j−x)!2jiP (i)log(
(2j)!xi−x
(2j−x)!2ji(Wi )
)).
Proof: see the appendix.
Intuitively, Theorem 4 says that a false positive reduces the revealed infor-
mation about the uncertainty of the number of keywords to the server.
– The information leakage from g(W ): To query for a keyword w the client
sends the query g(w) = h(w) to the server. According to assumption 2:
εg = I(W ;h(W )) = 0 (14)
Therefore, a query in the SI scheme does not reveal any information about
the queried keyword.
– The information leakage from v(f(M), g(W )): In contrast with the SWP
scheme, the metadata is a set of keywords. Hence, each keyword in the
metadata is unique and by a search result the server learns nothing about
the metadata.
εv = I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) = 0 (15)
Summarizing, using even perfectly secure cryptographic primitives for the SI
scheme, the searchable representation reveals information to the server. The
probability of false positive increases the security of the SI.
4.3 Idealized PEKS
The PEKS scheme was originally proposed for transforming a set of keywords
to a searchable representation. However, the scheme is capable of transforming
a sequence of keywords to a searchable representation as well, since a different
random value ri is considered to transform each keyword wi to a searchable
representation (see section 2.4 PEKS). In other words, the same keywords can
be mapped to a different searchable representation. Therefore we consider the
metadata as a sequence of keywords. Since an information theoretic approach
cannot handle public key cryptography, we analyze only the hash function of
the PEKS scheme. In other words, our analysis relies on the security of the hash
function only.
– The information leakage from s(D,K): According to assumption 1,
s(D,K) is one time-pad encryption. Hence,
εs = I(D, s(D,K)) = 0 (16)
Therefore, the stored data does not reveal any information about the data.
– The information leakage from f(M): Since the client uses a secure ta-
ble and a unique random value to transform each keyword to a searchable
representation, the server cannot learn anything about the metadata. Hence,
εf = I(M ; f(M)) = 0 (17)
Therefore, the server cannot learn anything about the metadata due to the
knowledge of the searchable representation.
– The information leakage from g(W ): To query for a keyword w the
server sends the query g(w) = h(w)α to the server. According to assumption
2,
εg = I(W ;h(W )α) = 0 (18)
Therefore, the server cannot learn anything about the plaintext of the query
after receiving a query.
– The information leakage from v(f(M), g(W )): Similar to the case of the
SWP scheme, before performing any search by the client, the server cannot
learn the unique keywords in the metadata. However, after a search for the
keyword w, the server learns the repeated keywords in case of a match. By
the same analysis as of Theorem 2, the information leakage from a search is
calculated as follows:
εv = I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) = H(W )(E(S)− 1) (19)
Summarizing, using even perfectly secure cryptographic primitives for the PEKS
scheme, a search reveals some information to the server.
Table 2 summarizes the information leakage from the parameters of the SWP,
SI and PEKS schemes. In this table the analysis of the two trivial schemes from
the introduction is included for comparison. Trivial solution 1 lets the server
return the entire encrypted data base to the client at each query. In this case
the server never learns anything about the data, hence εs = εf = εg = εv = 0.
Trivial solution 2 lets the server decrypt all data at the first query, hence, the
uncertainty in the keywords H(W ) and the data H(D) is leaked to the server
at the first query.
Information leakage from
Scheme Stored data Searchable representation Query Search
εs εf εg εv
Schemes that do not leak at all
Trivial solution 1 0 0 0 0
Schemes that leak at each search
Trivial solution 2 0 0 H(W ) H(D)
SWP 0 0 0 (E(S)− 1)H(W )
PEKS 0 0 0 (E(S)− 1)H(W )
schemes that only leak up front
SI 0 H(L)− β 0 0
Table 2. Summary of the information leakage from the parameters of the SWP,
SI, and PEKS schemes, as well as the two trivial schemes. In this table β =∑|W|
i=1
∑i
x=1(P (i)log(
1
(Wi )
) + (2
j)!xi−l
(2j−x)!2jiP (i)log(
(2j)!xi−x
(2j−x)!2ji(Wi )
)) (see 4.2)
We conclude by categorizing the seminal searchable encryption schemes into
three groups: (1) schemes that do not leak at all, (2) schemes that leak everything
up front, and (3) schemes that leak nothing up front but which leak at each
search. In practice this means that if an application is expected to perform
many searches, a scheme from the second group is probably best. If we have a
scenario where only a few searches are expected, a scheme from the third group
is best.
5 Related Work
Our analysis of the information leakage of searchable encryption is limited to the
three seminal schemes, SWP, PEKS and SI. However, we believe that the same
analysis can be applied to more recent schemes based on the seminal schemes.
Here, we discuss the most prominent searchable encryption schemes that follow
the seminal schemes.
SWP based schemes. For XML documents Brinkman et al [5] modify the
SWP scheme to facilitate a faster search by exploiting the tree structure of
XML documents.
SI based schemes. Chang and Mitzenmacher [6] propose a scheme based on
mapping keywords of the metadata to hash values. The proposed scheme has a
lower probability of false positives than the SI scheme and the scheme also hides
the number of keywords in the metadata from the server. Curtmola et al [7]
propose a symmetric key encryption approach that offers better efficiency than
the SI scheme, and the scheme can be applied for multiple users scenarios by
generating a random value for each user.
PEKS based schemes. The schemes proposed by Abdalla et al [10] lowers
the probability of false positives in the PEKS scheme. Bellare et al [2] propose
a deterministic searchable encryption scheme that offers faster search than the
PEKS scheme by mapping each searchable representation to an index. Baek et
al [1] propose a modified PEKS in such a way that the client could send a query
through an insecure channel by mapping each keyword to several hash values.
Park et al [13] propose a modified PEKS that gives a proxy the ability to decrypt
searchable representations containing desired keywords. Fuhr at al [8] propose
a scheme that allows the client to recover the plaintext of the keywords after
transforming the metadata to a searchable encryption. The scheme applies the
xor operation to the searchable representation and the hash value of a random
value. The random value is kept by the client.
None of the extensions to the seminal schemes use primitives that cannot be
idealized in the same way as we have idealized encryption and hashing. Therefore
we believe that our methods are applicable to the extensions of the seminal
schemes. To prove this is future work.
6 Example
In this section we present a few numerical examples to illustrate what the anal-
ysis actually means. Our cryptographic primitives in this example are chosen
according to assumptions 1 and 2. According to assumption 4, the distribution
of the keywords in the metadata is uniform and we consider a Poisson distribu-
tion for the distribution of the number of keywords (P (l)) in the metadata as
follows [12]:
P (l) =
λle−λ
l!
(20)
Here λ is the expected number of keywords in the metadata. Let the cardinality
of keyword in metadata be equal to the size of Oxford dictionary, 126000 words.
Moreover, let the expected number of keywords in the metadata be λ = 100.
SWP and PEKS: The expected number of the repeated keywords E(S) =
16.9 1126000 and the enctropy of keywords is H(W ) = 16.9 Hence the information
leakage from the parameters is then as follows, εd = εf + εg = 0, and εv =
16.9 1126000 .
SI: The SI scheme is applied to a set of keywords. Let assume there is no false
positives. The entropy of the number of the number of keywords is H(L) = 5.14.
Hence, the information leakage from the parameter is: εd = εg = εv = 0 and
εf = 5.14. Now, let the number of in the hash of keywords be j = 200, Then,
H(L) = 4.7.
The example shows that in the case that the client performs only a few
searches on the stored data (e.g. backup scenarios), the SWP scheme or the
PEKS scheme would be ideal. However, In the case that the client intends to
send many queries to the server, the SI scheme is a better choice since this
scheme has higher efficiency.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We present an information theoretic analysis of searchable encryption, where a
single client stores a single data item on a single server. Any number of keywords
may be associated with the data item and the client can perform any number of
queries. We propose a generic formulation for the searchable encryption problem
and apply the formulation to all three seminal schemes (SWP, SI, and PEKS)
from the literature. We then formalize the security of searchable encryption us-
ing the tools of information theory and analyze the seminal schemes. The results
of our analysis shows that even using perfectly secure cryptographic primitives,
the parameters of all seminal schemes leak some information to the server. Our
analysis shows that each scheme has its specific strengths and weaknesses in
terms of provable security, hidden query and query isolation, and thus provides
a useful tool to compare searchable encryption schemes. In future work we in-
tend to extend the analysis to multiple data, multiple client and multiple server
settings.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Here we prove Theorem 1. Using standard information theoretic rules,
I(D; s(S,K), f(M)) = I(D; s(D,K)) + I(D; f(M)|s(D,K)) (21)
By information theoretic rules:
I(D; f(M)|s(D,K)) ≤ I(D; f(M)) (22)
I(D; f(M)) = H(D)−H(D|f(M)) (23)
I(D; f(M)) = H(D)−H(D|f(M)) +H(D|M)−H(D|M) (24)
The random variables D −→M −→ f(M) form a Markov chain since
P (d|m, f(m)) = P (d|m). (25)
According to the Markov chain rule, H(D|M) = H(D|M,f(M)). Hence,
I(D; f(M)) = H(D)−H(D|f(M)) +H(D|M,f(M))−H(D|M). (26)
The mutual information I(D; f(M) is evaluated below:
I(D; f(M)) = I(D;M)− I(D;M |f(M)) (27)
Working at the right hand side:
I(D;M) = H(M)−H(M |D) (28)
I(D;M |f(M)) = H(M |f(M))−H(M |f(M), D) (29)
By substituting 28 and 29 into 27 we obtain:
I(D; f(M)) = I(M ; f(M))− I(M ; f(M)|D) (30)
B Proof of Theorem 2
Here we prove Theorem 2. To evaluate the mutual information
I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) = H(M)−H(M |v(f(M), g(W ))), (31)
we first evaluate the entropy H(M), we then evaluate the conditional entropy
H(M |v(f(M), g(W ))).
Before performing any search, the server knows the number of keywords in
the metadata. Hence,
H(M) =
∑
l
P (l)(H(W1) + ...+H(Wl)) (32)
Here, Wi denotes the i-th keywords in the metadata. According to assumption
4 each keyword in the metadata is chosen uniformly, therefore for each i and
j, H(Wi) = H(Wj). Let, H(Wi) = H(W ), since, H(M) =
∑
l lP (l)H(W ) and
the expected number of keywords is, E(L) = ∑l P (l)l, we obtain, H(M) =
E(L)H(W ).
We now evaluate the conditional entropy H(M |v(f(M), g(W ))). Let s be the
expected number of keywords in metadata items that matches the query. After
a search has performed, the server learns the keywords that match the query.
Therefore, the conditional entropy is computed as follows:
H(M |v(f(M), g(W ))) =
∑
l
P (l)H(W1)+...+H(Wl)−
∑
s
P (s)H(W1)+...+H(Ws)
(33)
Hence, the mutual information I(M ; v(f(M), g(W )) is evaluated below:
I(M ; v(f(M), g(W ))) = E(L)H(W )− (E(L)H(W ) + E(S)H(W )) = E(S)H(W )
(34)
Evaluating the expected number of repeated keywords s, we have, E(s) =∑s P (s).
The probability P (s) is calculated as P (s) = ( 1|W| )
s( |W|−1|W| )
l−s. Let assume
|W| >> 1, then P (s) = ( 1|W |)s. Therefore, we obtain, E(S) =
∑|W|
s=1 s(
1
|W| )
s. In
case |W| >> 1, E(S) ≈∑|W|s=1 1|W| .
C Proof of Theorem 3
Here we prove Theorem 3. Write the mutual information I(M ; f(M)) = H(M)−
H(M |f(M)). We first evaluate the entropy H(M), we then evaluate the condi-
tional entropy H(M |f(M)).
According to standard information theoretic rules, the entropy H(M) =
−∑m P (m)log(P (m)). We extend the probability function P (m) to P (m) =∑
l P (m|l)P (l). Hence, the entropy H(M) is evaluated below:
H(M) = −
∑
m
∑
l
P (m|l)P (l)log(
∑
l
P (m|l)P (l)). (35)
The conditional probability P (m|l) is evaluated as follows:
P (m|l) =
{
1
(Wl )
if |m| = l
0 Otherwise
The conditional probability P (m|l) below:
P (m|l) = δ(|m|, l)(W
l
) (36)
where, δ(|m|, l) =
{
1 if |m| = l
0 Otherwise Hence,∑
l
P (m|l) = 1(W
l
) (37)
Hence,
H(M) = −
∑
l
(Wl )∑
m=1
1(W
l
)P (l)log(P (l)(W
l
) ) = −∑
l
P (l)log(
P (l)(W
l
) ) (38)
We now evaluate the conditional entropy H(M |f(M)). Knowing the searchable
representation f(m) the server learns the number of unique keywords l in the
metadata. Hence, H(M |f(M)) = H(M |L). The conditional Entropy H(M |L) is
evaluated below:
H(M |L) = −
∑
m
∑
l
P (m|l)P (l)log(P (m|l)) (39)
By substituting 37 into 39,
H(M |L) = −
∑
l
(Wl )∑
m=1
P (l)log(
1(W
l
) ) (40)
Hence, the evaluation of the mutual mutual information I(M ; f(M)) = H(M)−
H(M |L) is as follows,
H(M)−H(M |L) = −
∑
l
P (l)log(P (l)) (41)
Since H(L) = −∑l P (l)log(P (l)), obtain I(M ; f(M)) = H(L)
D Proof of Theorem 4
Here we prove Theorem 4. Let j be the number of bits of hash values, l be the
number of hash values in the searchable representation and |m| be the number
of keywords in the metadata. Using standard information theoretic rule, the
conditional entropy H(M |L) is evaluated as follows;
H(M |L) = P (m, l)logP (m|l) (42)
We split the joint probability P (m, l) to the number of keywords, P (m, l) =∑
|m| P (m, l||m|)P (|m|) =
∑
|m| P (m||m|)P (|m||l)P (|m|), where, P (m||m|) =
1
(|W||m|)
. We evaluate the conditional probability P (|m||l). Since |m| ≥ l,
P (|m||l) =
{
0 if l > |m|
( 2
j−1
2j )...(
2j−l+1
2j )(
l
2j )
|m|−l if l ≤ |m| (43)
Hence,
P (m|l) =
0 if l > |m|( 2j−12j )...( 2j−l+12j )( l2j )|m|−l( W‖m|) if l ≤ |m| (44)
To evaluate H(M |L), write, H(M |L) = P (m, l)log(P (m|l)). The conditional
probability P (m|l) is evaluated below,
P (m, l) =
|W|∑
|m|=l
P (m|l, |m|)P (|m|) (45)
Since, P (m|l, |m|) = P (m||m|),
P (m|l, |m|) = 1(|W|
|m|
) (46)
Hence, the conditional entropy is calculated as follows,
H(M |L) =
|W|∑
|m|=1
i∑
l=1
(2j)!l|m|−l
(2j − l)!2j|m|P (|m|)log(
(2j)!l|m|−l
(2j)!2j|m|
(W
|m|
) ) (47)
Using (38),
H(M) = −
|W|∑
l
(
P (l)(W
l
) )P (l)log(P (l)(W
l
) ) (48)
Hence, I(M ; f(M)) is evaluated as follows,
I(M ; f(M)) = H(L)−
∑
|m|
P (|m|)log( 1(W
i
) )+ |W|∑
|m|=1
i∑
l=1
(2j)!l|m|−l
(2j − l)!2j|m|P (|m|)log(
(2j)!l|m|−l
(2j)!2j|m|
(W
|m|
) )
(49)
